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Abstract
Content-based publish-subscribe is an efficient communication paradigm
that supports dynamic, many-to-many data dissemination in a distributed
environment. A publish-subscribe system deployed over a wide-area net-
work must handle information dissemination across distinct authoritative
domains and heterogeneous platforms. Such an environment raises serious
security concerns. This paper describes a practical scheme that preserves
confidentiality against eavesdroppers for private content-based publish-subscribe
systems over public networks. In this scheme, publications and subscrip-
tions are encrypted, while the publish-subscribe infrastructure is able to
make correct routing decisions based on encrypted publications and sub-
scriptions. Plaintexts are not revealed in the infrastructure for the purpose
of security and efficiency. This scheme efficiently supports interval-matching
as a predicate function for subscriptions. The security of this scheme is an-
alyzed, and further improved by several techniques.
Keywords: Content-based publish-subscribe system, confidentiality, interval-
matching, prefix-matching, prefix-preserving encryption/decryption.
1 Introduction
This paper describes an efficient scheme that preserves confidentiality against
eavesdroppers for private content-based publish-subscribe systems over public
networks. The content-based publish-subscribe (pub-sub) model [23] is an effi-
cient communication paradigm that supports dynamic, many-to-many data dis-
semination in a distributed environment. One pioneering work on content-based
pub-sub is the IBM Gryphon project [3, 4, 21, 22], which has been deployed over
the Internet for real-time sports score distribution at the US Tennis Open, Ryder
Cup, and Australian Open, and for monitoring and statistics reporting at the
Sydney Olympics [1].
In general, a pub-sub system is a data dissemination system that consists of
information providers, who publish events (the unit of information in this paper)
to the system, information consumers, who subscribe to particular categories of
events, and a network of brokers, who are responsible for routing events from
publishers to interested subscribers. In this paper the broker network is often
referred to as the infrastructure of a pub-sub system. In a content-based pub-sub
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system, an event schema specifies the types of information carried in an event and
a language is defined for subscribers to describe events that are of interest to them.
Such description is often defined as a predicate function over the event content.
With the events from publishers and the predicate functions from subscribers,
the broker network is responsible for dispatching the events from publishers to
interested subscribers.
One example of content-based pub-sub system is the stock quote pub-sub
system described in [3, 4, 21, 22]. A stock event schema may include the stock
symbol, price, and volume, of string, dollar, and integer types respectively. A
subscription is defined as a predicate over those three attributes, such as (symbol
= “ATT”) and ($20 ≤ price ≤ $80) and (2000 ≤ volume ≤ 4000 or 20000 ≤
volume ≤ 40000). Upon receipt of a stock event, the broker network performs
an exact-matching on the stock symbol and interval-matchings on the price and
volume according to the subscription and decides whether the event should be
routed to the subscriber. For example, an event in which the symbol is “ATT”,
the price is $50 and the volume is 3000 will be routed to the subscriber through
the broker network.
The security concerns of content-based pub-sub systems have been pointed
out in [26], but most of the solutions remain open problems. One major security
issue is confidentiality.
• When information being published contains sensitive content, publishers and
subscribers may wish to keep the event content secret. For example, an ap-
plication distributing premium stock reports may want to make sure that only
interested subscribers can access the data. This is referred to as information
confidentiality [26].
• User subscriptions can reveal sensitive information about the user, in which
case the subscriber may wish to keep the subscriptions private. For example, in
the stock quote pub-sub system, subscribers may not want others to know which
stocks they are interested in. This is referred to as subscription confidentiality [26].
Corporations with many sites often build private networks over public networks.
Therefore the broker network may not be well protected. The broker network may
operate on top of a heterogeneous network infrastructure that is poorly protected
at some places. For example, the broker network may have links over a wireless
network that often has weak protection. Therefore, the plaintexts of publica-
tions/subscriptions need to be protected from the infrastructure. Meanwhile the
content-based pub-sub system should still preserve its functionality, and ideally
work as efficiently as before.
One simple way to preserve the confidentiality is the point-to-point encryp-
tion/decryption approach. The publishers encrypt every published event using
an established encryption scheme. Then event brokers will decrypt the event,
examine the content, and route the event to the interested subscribers after re-
encrypting it. There are several drawbacks with this approach. First, the event
is decrypted and encrypted at each broker on the path from the publisher to the
interested subscriber. This is very inefficient. Second, brokers are not necessarily
well protected. It may not be secure to reveal plaintexts to brokers.
The objective of this paper is to propose an efficient security scheme for
content-based pub-sub systems such that the infrastructure can perform content-
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based routing without knowing the plaintexts of publications/subscriptions. By
transforming interval-matching into prefix-matching and applying a prefix-preserving
encryption algorithm, we propose a novel scheme to achieve the objective.
The paper is organized as the follows, in Section 2, we define the problem
formally and describe the setting for which our scheme is proposed. Section 3
surveys the related work and discusses possible solutions based on well-known
mechanisms. In Section 4, we present a simple scheme that can only support
exact-matching as the predicate function straightforwardly, and then in Section 5,
we present a scheme that efficiently supports interval-matching as a predicate
function. First we show how an interval-matching problem can be transformed
into a set of prefix-matching problems. Then the prefix-preserving encryption
algorithm is presented and the corresponding decryption algorithm is provided.
At the end of the section, we describe a protocol that enables content-based
routing without revealing the plaintexts to the infrastructure. Section 6 analyzes
the security of the proposed scheme, followed by Section 7 where we discuss how
to improve the security of our scheme. We then conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 Problem description
A content-based pub-sub system consists of subscribers, publishers, brokers, an
event schema and predicate functions expressing subscribers’ interest. While the
concepts like subscribers, publishers and brokers are quite clear, we give a more
formal description of the event schema and predicate functions.
Throughout this paper, attributes are denoted by capital letters, such as
I, J, K, and attribute values are denoted by lowercase letters such as i, j, k. An
event schema is a tuple of attributes {I1, I2, ..., In}, and an event is an instance
of the event schema. There can be additional content associated with the event
that is not included in the event schema. We call this information the payload
of the event. Because the payload is not needed for the content-based routing,
in this paper we will only be concerned with the attributes of the event that are
included in the event schema. In the stock quote example, the attributes are I1
= symbol (of string), I2 = price (of dollar) and I3 = volume (of integer). The
event schema is defined as the tuple (symbol, price, volume). An event is an
instance of the event schema, e.g., (“ATT”, $50, 3000). A predicate function is
a boolean function that returns true when the input (an event) is in a subset
of the event schema such as (i1=“ATT”, $20 ≤ i2 ≤ $80, 2000 ≤ i3 ≤ 4000 or
20000 ≤ i3 ≤ 40000).
In general, we can assume that content-based pub-sub systems allow each
predicate to be range-based, composed of intervals in the underlying domain of
the predicate [21, 22]. By decomposing a subscription with multiple such ranges
into multiple subscriptions consisting of single ranges we can see that it is suffi-
cient only to consider intervals, albeit at a cost of more subscriptions. And even
attributes such as name, not typically thought of as numerical, can be indexed and
therefore linearized in some fashion. Thus we restrict our pub-sub model in such a
way that the predicate function can only be exact-matching or interval-matching
1. Interval-matching is defined as a boolean function f[a,b](x), which returns true
1Those more complex predicate functions usually can be converted into exact-matching,
though it might not be efficient to do so.
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if and only if x ∈ [a, b]. Because computers can handle only inherently finite and
discrete attribute values, one can assume without loss of generality x, a and b are
all nonnegative integers. Exact-matching is a special case of interval-matching
in which a is equal to b. We will only be concerned with interval-matching or
exact-matching as a predicate function.
In this paper we are not attempting to deal with a pub-sub system that has
a universe of subscribers/publishers. Instead, we are targeting private pub-sub
systems over public networks. Our scheme is proposed for those pub-sub systems
in which publishers and subscribers are able to share some secret. This is re-
alistic when publishers and subscribers are all from a same organization, e.g., a
corporation.
The issue of confidentiality protection is that the plaintexts of publications
and subscriptions need to be kept confidential from the infrastructure to counter
against eavesdropping, and the infrastructure must still be able to efficiently make
correct routing decisions.
3 Related work
Several approaches based on well-known mechanisms have been discussed in [26].
A potential technique that can provide information confidentiality is comput-
ing with encrypted data [14, 2]. However, an expensive protocol between the
publishers and subscribers is needed. A closely related topic to subscription con-
fidentiality is Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [11, 12]. PIR mechanisms allow
clients to access entries in a database without revealing which entries they are
interested in. PIR and subscription confidentiality are very closely related [26].
All PIR-based schemes move some filtering operations from the database to the
user, which implies more communication overhead as well as subscriber-side com-
putation load. Therefore, there will be challenges regarding performance and
efficiency.
Many researchers have investigated the problem of zero-knowledge proof [15,
17]. In particular, several protocols have been proposed [18, 6, 5] to prove that a
committed number lies in an interval without actually revealing the number. But
the performance in terms of bandwidth and CPU power makes these protocols
unattractive to the pub-sub systems. Moreover, it can only be used to preserve in-
formation confidentiality. Secure multi-party computation has also been intensely
studied [29, 16, 8]. It would require a high computation and communication over-
head if secure multi-party computation is used to solve the problem of preserving
confidentiality in content-based pub-sub systems.
Aforementioned techniques are often computationally intensive and require a
large amount of communication overhead, which could be prohibitively expensive
to carry out in content-based pub-sub systems. Also, most of these techniques can
either only preserve information confidentiality or only preserve subscription con-
fidentiality. In contrast, the efficient scheme presented in this paper can preserve
both information confidentiality and subscription confidentiality.
Opyrchal et al. have studied the “secure end-point delivery” problem in
content-based pub-sub system, i.e., how to make sure only authorized subscribers
can access the data [19]. In a content-based system, every event can potentially
have a different set of interested subscribers. When the number of subscribers
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is large, it is infeasible to setup static security groups for every possible subset.
Their approach is to use a dynamic caching scheme, where the last-hop broker
and subscribers cache subgroup keys. The “secure end-point delivery” problem
and the problem addressed by this paper are complementary to each other.
4 A simple scheme
Since we are targeting private pub-sub systems over public networks, it is pos-
sible for publishers and subscribers to share some secret keys. Many group key
distribution protocols have been proposed in the literature [7, 27, 20]. For ex-
ample, ELK [20] can be used for publishers and subscribers to share secret keys.
Since the key distribution problem is orthogonal to the problem addressed by
this paper, we do not elaborate it. In a private pub-sub system, the total num-
ber of publishers/subscribers will not be too large. Therefore, key distribution is
feasible.
A simple cryptographic scheme can be as follows. With a secret key, de-
noted by κ, publishers and subscribers construct a one-to-one mapping Fκ :
(i1, i2, ..., in) → (j1, j2, ..., jn). We call (j1, j2, ..., jn) the encrypted event of event
(i1, i2, ..., in) in the remainder of the paper, and the mapping Fκ is termed as
the encrypt function. Before sending out an event, a publisher encrypts it by
applying Fκ. Therefore, a published event will be Fκ(event). A subscriber gener-
ates a set of encrypted events according to his/her interest and subscribes to the
network. As publishers and subscribers share the same secret key, the encrypted
events they generate will match as long as the original events match. Therefore,
encrypted events can be routed correctly to subscribers by brokers while the plain-
texts of publications/subscriptions are protected. After receiving an encrypted
event, subscribers can decrypt the event, because Fκ is a one-to-one mapping.
One straightforward way to build the mapping Fκ would be to pad attributes
into a multiple of 64-bit or 128-bit fields that is suitable for applying standard
encryption algorithms like DES or AES [13]. Then, by applying the encryption
algorithm, we can obtain encrypted attributes. Thus a mapping Fκ is established.
The drawback of this simple scheme is that it can only support exact-matching
as a predicate function. Interval-matching must be transformed into a set of exact-
matchings, potentially generating an intractable number of comparisons per event.
Instead, what is needed is a scheme that efficiently supports interval-matching as
a predicate function, yielding reduced computation and communication burdens.
In the remainder of this paper, such a scheme will be proposed and discussed.
5 An efficient scheme
5.1 Transforming interval-matching into prefix-matching
We have seen that it is very important to efficiently support interval-matching as a
predicate function. In this section, we will transform interval-matching into prefix-
matching. Prefix-matching has been used widely in networks and databases. The
transformation is based on the fact that an arbitrary interval can be converted
into a union of prefix ranges, where a prefix range is one that can be expressed by
a prefix [25]. For example, the interval [32, 111], the 8-bit binary representation
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of which is [00100000, 01101111], can be represented by a set of prefixes {001∗,
010∗, 0110∗}. Throughout this paper, the notation ∗ is used to denote an arbitrary
suffix. To verify that a number is in the interval is equivalent to check that the
number matches any of those prefixes in the set. For example, 37 (00100101 in
binary) is in the interval as it matches prefix 001∗, while 128 (10000000 in binary)
is not in the interval since it matches none of those three prefixes.
Let n denote the length of the binary representation of the data, and let pn
denote the number of prefixes needed to represent an interval. We have the fol-
lowing theorem on the upper bound of pn.
Theorem 1 For any interval [a1a2 · · · an, b1b2 · · · bn] (n ≥ 2), pn ≤ 2(n − 1).
The proof of this theorem is presented in Appendix A. Note that for interval
[1, 2n−2], it can be easily verified that pn is equal to 2(n−1). Therefore, the upper
bound is tight. In the simple scheme mentioned in the previous section, interval-
matching must be transformed into a set of exact-matchings. The upper bound
of the number of exact-matchings needed for an interval [a1a2 · · · an, b1b2 · · · bn]
is 2n. Thus the approach we present in this section is much more efficient than
the simple scheme mentioned in previous section.
In Figure 1 we present a recursive algorithm to generate the set of prefixes for
a given interval [a1a2 · · · an, b1b2 · · · bn].
1. Starting from k = 1, find the most significant bit, numbered k, for which
ak < bk.
2. If k is not found, i.e., for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai = bi, then the interval can be
denoted by prefix a1a2 · · · an. Return a1a2 · · · an.
3. If for all k ≤ i ≤ n, ai = 0 and bi = 1, then return a1a2ak−1∗ (return ∗ if
k = 1).
4. Transform interval [a1a2 · · · an, b1b2 · · · bn]
into [a1 · · · ak−10ak+1 · · · an, a1 · · · ak−1011 · · · 1] ∪
[a1 · · · ak−1100 · · · 0, a1 · · · ak−11bk+1 · · · bn].
5. Run this algorithm with interval [ak+1 · · · an, 11 · · · 1] as input, concate-
nate a1 · · · ak−10 before all the returned prefixes. Then run this algorithm
with interval [00 · · · 0, bk+1 · · · bn] as input, concatenate a1 · · · ak−11 before all
the returned prefixes. Return all the prefixes.
Figure 1: The Algorithm for transforming interval [a1a2 · · · an, b1b2 · · · bn] into
prefixes
We have seen that matching an interval based on a set of prefix-matchings
is both simple and efficient. Therefore prefix-preserving encryption/decryption
algorithms can be used to efficiently support interval-matching as a predicate
function while preserving the confidentiality of the pub-sub system.
5.2 Prefix-preserving encryption/decryption
After transforming interval-matching into prefix-matching, we need a prefix-preserving
encryption/decryption scheme, so that brokers will be able to route encrypted
publications based on encrypted subscriptions. We apply an encryption scheme
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proposed by Xu et al. [28] for prefix-preserving IP address anonymization. First
we introduce a formal definition of prefix-preserving encryption.
Definition 1 (Prefix-preserving encryption) (adapted from [28]) We say
that two n-bit numbers a = a1a2 · · · an and b = b1b2 · · · bn share a k-bit prefix
(0 ≤ k ≤ n), if a1a2 · · ·ak = b1b2 · · · bk, and ak+1 6= bk+1 when k < n. An en-
cryption function E is defined as a one-to-one function from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n.
An encryption function E is said to be prefix-preserving, if, given two numbers a
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Figure 2: An example of prefix-preserving encryption
It is helpful to consider a geometric interpretation of prefix-preserving en-
cryption. If a plaintext can take any value of a n-bit number, the entire set of
plaintexts can be represented by a complete binary tree of height n. This is called
the plaintext tree. Each node in the plaintext tree (excluding the root node) cor-
responds to a bit position, indicated by the height of the node, and a bit value,
indicated by the direction of the branch from its parent node. Figure 2(a) shows
a plaintext tree (using 4-bit plaintexts for simplicity).
A prefix-preserving encryption function can be viewed as specifying a binary
variable for each non-leaf node (including the root node) of the plaintext tree.
This variable specifies whether the encryption function “flips” this bit or not.
Applying the encryption function results in the rearrangement of the plaintext
tree into a ciphertext tree. Figure 2(c) shows the ciphertext tree resulting from
the encryption function shown in Figure 2(b). Note that an encryption function
will, therefore, consist of 2n − 1 binary variables.
A general form of prefix-preserving encryption function is presented in [28].
Let fi be a function {0, 1}i to {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n − 1 and f0 is a constant
function. Given a plaintext a = a1a2 · · · an, the ciphertext a′1a′2 · · · a′n will be
computed by the algorithm given in Figure 3. According to Theorem 1 (canoni-
cal form theorem) in [28], the algorithm given in Figure 3 is a prefix-preserving
encryption algorithm.
Since originally the prefix-preserving encryption algorithm was proposed for
IP address anonymization, the corresponding decryption algorithm was not pre-
sented. Here we present a decryption algorithm for the prefix-preserving encryp-
tion algorithm. Given a ciphertext a′1a
′
2 · · ·a′n, the plaintext a1a2 · · · an can be
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1. Compute a′i as ai⊕fi−1(a1a2 · · · ai−1), where ⊕ stands for the exclusive-or
operation, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
2. Return a′1a
′
2 · · · a′n.
Figure 3: Prefix-preserving encryption algorithm
computed by the algorithm given in Figure 4.
1. Initially we have f0. Let i = 1.
2. Compute ai as a
′
i ⊕ fi−1(a1a2 · · · ai−1).
3. Let i = i + 1. If i ≤ n, then go to step 2. Otherwise, return a1a2 · · · an.
Figure 4: Decryption algorithm
In [28], the prefix-preserving encryption scheme is defined as instantiating
functions fi with cryptographically strong stream ciphers or block ciphers as
follows:
fi(a1a2 · · ·ai) := L(R(P(a1a2 · · · ai), κ)) (1)
where i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1 and L returns the “least significant bit”. Here R is a
pseudorandom function or a pseudorandom permutation (i.e., a block cipher), and
P is a padding function that expands a1a2 · · ·ai into a longer string that matches
the block size of R. κ is the cryptographic key used in the pseudorandom function
R. Its length should follow the guideline specified for the pseudorandom function
that is actually adopted.
5.3 The protocol
With the prefix-preserving encryption/decryption algorithms, denoted by E and
D respectively, the protocol runs as follows. When a publisher wants to send out
an event (i1, i2, ..., in), he/she encrypts each attribute with the prefix-preserving
encryption algorithm. Then the encrypted event (E(i1), E(i2), ..., E(in)) is sent
out. When a subscriber wants to subscribe, he/she computes (P1, P2, ..., Pn) with
the algorithm given in Figure 1, where Pi (i = 1, 2, ..., n) is a set of prefixes
representing intervals. Before subscribing, the subscriber also applies the prefix-
preserving encryption to every prefix in Pi. The infrastructure can then route
encrypted events correctly based on encrypted predicate functions 2. We present
our protocol formally as follows.
When a publisher wants to send out an event (i1, i2, ..., in),
1. Each attribute is encrypted with the prefix-preserving encryption algorithm.
2. The encrypted event (E(i1), E(i2), ..., E(in)) is published.
2Several researchers have studied the problem of evaluating a possibly large number of pred-
icates against message like data (events) in the domain of content-based forwarding for publish-
subscribe systems. For this problem, various forms of decision trees and indexing structures for
subscriptions have been proposed (see, e.g., [3, 10]). Content-based routing protocols have also
been proposed (see, e.g., [4, 9]). The dispatching of encrypted events in our proposed scheme
can be achieved by naturally applying these techniques.
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When a subscriber wants to subscribe his/her predicate, which is a set of
interval-matching functions in the attribute sets,
1. The intervals that are used for the predicate against each attribute are
translated into a set of prefixes, Pi, i = 1, 2, ..., n, using the algorithm given
in Figure 1.
2. The prefix-preserving encryption algorithm is applied to each prefix in the
tuple (P1, P2, ..., Pn), resulting in a tuple of encrypted prefix sets (P ′1, P ′2, ..., P ′n).
3. The encrypted prefix sets are subscribed to the broker network.
Upon receipt of an encrypted event, a broker checks if the encrypted event
satisfies a certain encrypted subscription by checking if attributes in the event
match any of the prefixes in the corresponding prefix set. After receiving an
event, subscribers apply the decryption algorithm to recover the original value of
the attributes.
The encryption function can be performed quickly as it only involves n sym-
metric key cryptographic operations, and these n operations can be done in paral-
lel. The decryption also only involves n symmetric key cryptographic operations,
though these n operations have to be done serially. The prefix-matching can be
done very efficiently, thus the routing decision by brokers can be made quickly.
Therefore, high performance in the content-based pub-sub can be achieved. Also,
the prefix-preserving encryption scheme preserves the bit length of the plaintext
as well, hence the ciphertext requires no more space than the plaintext.
The prefix-preserving technique leaks information, i.e., the security of the
proposed scheme is limited for the purpose of efficiency. In Section 6 we analyze
the security of prefix-preserving encryption, and in Section 7 several techniques
are proposed to further improve the security of the system.
6 Security analysis
Since we assume that the connections among publishers and subscribers can be
over public networks, an attacker can eavesdrop the connections and download the
encrypted messages (publications or subscriptions). In this section we analyze the
security of the proposed encryption/decryption scheme. It has been proved that
with the instantiating functions as (1) our prefix-preserving encryption scheme is
indistinguishable from a random prefix-preserving function, a function uniformly
chosen from the set of all prefix-preserving functions when the adversaries are
assumed to be computationally bounded. This is elaborated in [28]. Moreover,
as mentioned in Section 5.2, when plaintexts can take any value of a n-bit num-
ber, the prefix-preserving encryption function consists of 2n − 1 binary variables.
Therefore, we have a key of 22
n−1 possibilities. For example, when n is only 16,
the number of possible keys is 265535. Therefore, the key κ in (1) can be chosen
to be sufficiently long such that it is impractical for eavesdroppers to try each
possible key to compromise our scheme.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss another possible way in which
our scheme may be attacked. An eavesdropper is assumed to have compro-
mised (gain full knowledge to) certain number of 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 pairs
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through means other than compromising the key (i.e., the known plaintext at-
tack model). Then he/she will be able to infer information from other ciphertexts
by prefix-matching, because the encryption is prefix-preserving. For example, if
an eavesdropper knows 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 pair 〈a1a2 · · · an, a′1a′2 · · · a′n〉, then
given another ciphertext a′1a
′
2 · · · a′k−1a′kbk+1 · · · b′n, he/she knows the k-bit prefix
of the plaintext should be a1a2 · · ·ak−1ak. Note that if an eavesdropper knows
one 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 pair 〈a1a2 · · ·an, a′1a′2 · · · a′n〉, then he/she should also
know the 〈plaintext, ciphtertext〉 pair 〈a1a2 · · ·an, a′1a′2 · · · a′n〉. Therefore, an
eavesdropper always knows an even number of 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 pairs.
Suppose an eavesdropper knows 2 pairs of 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉. Given a
random ciphertext, let A(n) denote the average length of the prefix that can be
inferred by prefix-matching, where n is the length of the binary representation of
the data. The probability that the k-bit prefix of the plaintext can be inferred
is 1
2k











2i = 2− 12n−1 < 2. In other words, on the average
an eavesdropper can infer no more than 2 bits from a random ciphertext, if he/she
knowns 2 pairs of 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉.
We also analyze the situation that an eavesdropper knows 2k (k > 1) pairs
of 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉. This is presented in Appendix B. In summary, when
n → ∞, given a ciphertext, the average length of the prefix that can be inferred
is bounded by log2 k + 2 based on numerical results. So the prefix information
an eavesdropper can obtain by comparing a ciphtertext against a few pairs of
〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 is limited. Therefore, we claim that our scheme is secure
even if a few pairs of 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 are known by an eavesdropper. It
is potentially dangerous when the number of 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 pairs accu-
mulates at the eavesdropper side, since it will lead to more prefix information of
encrypted messages to be revealed. The improved system discussed in the next
section will update the shared key among publishers and subscribers periodically.
Therefore, 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 pairs known by an eavesdropper will become
obsolete when the shared key for the encryption/decryption scheme is changed.
7 Improving the security
From the previous section we can see that it is possible for eavesdroppers to
partially reveal the content of publications/subscriptions. Some techniques are
discussed in this section to make the system more secure. The weakness of the
system depends on the amount of information the eavesdropper can collect from
publications and subscriptions. Hence, we can reinforce the confidentiality by
limiting the amount of information an eavesdropper can get against a specific en-
cryption function. This can be achieved in two ways. First, we can use different
keys to encrypt different attributes, thus prevent an eavesdropper from aggregat-
ing the information from different attributes. Second, the encryption/decryption
functions can be invalidated and renewed at constant time intervals. Therefore,
the amount of information disseminated by each encryption function is reduced.
Moreover, the knowledge on a particular encryption function will be obsolete after
the function becomes invalid. Thus, the lifetime of such knowledge is bounded by
the time intervals.
In the following we discuss the aforementioned two techniques together in de-
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tail, though they can work separately. The construction of encryption/decryption
functions is equivalent to the generation of secret keys. Therefore, it is sufficient
for us to discuss how to generate secret keys for the encryption/decryption func-
tions at time intervals. Suppose there are n attributes in an event schema. To
achieve the maximum security, a different key is needed to construct encryp-
tion/decryption functions for each attribute. Publishers and subscribers share n
secret keys κ1, κ2, ..., κn and an initial vector IV by using a group key distribution
protocol [7, 27, 20]. Session keys E(i)κ1 (IV ), E
(i)
κ2 (IV ), ..., E
(i)
κn(IV ) are generated
for the attributes in the ith time interval, where the notation E(i)κ (IV ) means ap-
plying some sort of encryption E (e.g. DES or AES [13]) for i times. Therefore,
























The proposed method is similar to the technique used in generating key stream
in the stream ciphers. However, it does not combine the encrypted blocks into
a key stream. Instead, the blocks are used as session keys for different time
intervals in the pub-sub system. The use of the session keys will also prevent
an eavesdropper from breaking the master keys even with the knowledge of some
session keys.
Because we are changing keys at constant time intervals, we must handle the
synchronization among subscribers and publishers. One possible solution is to let
publishers/subscribers independently update the keys based on time of day. This
requires synchronizing the clocks of all publishers/subscribers. Sometimes this
is difficult to achieve, especially in a wide-area network. In order to solve this
problem we introduce another entity called the synchronization server, which will
issue a key changing signal at constant time intervals. The synchronization server
can be viewed as a publisher in the network. All the other entities subscribe to it
for the key changing signal. Upon receipt of the signal, publishers and subscribers
update the session keys, and subscribers regenerate their subscriptions.
The problem is that the key changing signal will not arrive at the publish-
ers/subscribers at the same time. To ensure that events will be correctly routed
to subscribers, a publisher will encrypt the event with both the new and the old
keys for a certain time period ∆t1. Then the publisher discards the old keys and
starts using solely the new keys. Let the maximum difference among the prop-
agation delays from synchronization server to other entities be ∆tmax, and let
the maximum time needed for a new subscription to reach every broker be ∆tsub.
Then ∆t1 should be no less than ∆tmax plus ∆tsub. We assume both ∆tmax and
∆tsub are measurable or at least can be estimated. Upon receipt of a key changing
signal, subscribers should subscribe the new encrypted subscriptions immediately
and unsubscribe the old subscriptions after a certain period of time ∆t2, which
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should be no less than ∆tmax. During ∆t2, subscribers should try both the old
and the new decryption functions (We are assuming there is some signature in
the encrypted event, so subscribers will know which key is valid for the encrypted
event received.).
Changing keys at time intervals will secure the system in a very strong sense,
but it introduces additional traffic as publishers need to publish duplicate events
in a short time period and subscribers need to re-subscribe requests. It also
introduces more computation, because in a short period of time publishers need
to encrypt events twice, subscribers need to try two different sets of keys for
every event and brokers need to do more prefix-matchings. Therefore the change
must not be performed too frequently. Also using a synchronization server may
create a vulnerable point. Therefore, there is a need to build the synchronization
server with high level of security, or to deploy multiple synchronization servers to
provide backup for the signaling service.
8 Conclusions
This paper discusses concerns about protecting sensitive information of events
(publications) and predicate functions (subscriptions) from eavesdroppers in content-
based sub-pub systems. Events and predicate functions need to be encrypted,
while brokers should be able to efficiently make correct routing decisions based
on encrypted events and predicate functions. This issue is addressed by a novel
publication-subscription encryption/decryption scheme. This scheme efficiently
supports interval-matching as predicate functions by transforming interval-matching
into prefix-matching and using a prefix-preserving encryption algorithm. The
security of prefix-preserving encryption is analyzed, and several techniques are
proposed to further improve the security of the system. The paper shows that
this scheme preserves confidentiality while maintaining efficiency.
A major contribution of this paper is the efficient scheme supporting interval-
matching on encrypted data. This scheme can also be used in some other appli-
cations. For instance, it is desirable to store data on storage servers in encrypted
form to reduce security and privacy risks [24]. Our scheme can be used to effi-
ciently support range-based searching on encrypted data.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we offer a proof of Theorem 1 (introduced in Section 5.1), which
gives the upper bound of the number of prefixes needed to represent an interval.
We will use the same notations as in Section 5.1.
Lemma 1 For any interval [0, a1a2 · · · an], pn ≤ n.
Proof: We prove it by induction on n. The conclusion trivially holds for n = 1.
Suppose the conclusion also holds for n = k.
We now prove the lemma for n = k + 1. If a1 is equal to 0, then according to
induction hypothesis, we have pn ≤ k. If for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, ai = 1, then
the interval can be represented by prefix ∗, i.e., pn = 1. Otherwise, the inter-
val [0, a1a2 · · ·ak+1] can be represented by [0, 011 · · ·1] ∪ [100 · · · 0, 1a2 · · · ak+1].
[0, 011 · · ·1] can be represented by prefix 0∗. According to induction hypothesis,
we need at most k prefixes to represent interval [100 · · ·0, 1a2 · · · ak+1]. Hence for
n = k + 1, we have pn ≤ k + 1. 2
Lemma 2 For any interval [a1a2 · · · an, 11 · · · 1], pn ≤ n.
The proof is omitted here, because it is similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
Theorem 1 For any interval [a1a2 · · · an, b1b2 · · · bn] (n ≥ 2), pn ≤ 2(n − 1).
Proof: We prove it by induction on n.
For n = 2, if a1a2 = 00 or b1b2 = 11, then according to Lemma 1 and Lemma
2, we have pn ≤ 2. If a1a2 = b1b2 = 01 or 10, then pn = 1. If a1a2 = 01 and
b1b2 = 10, then pn = 2. So the conclusion holds for n = 2.
Suppose the conclusion also holds for n = k.
We now prove the theorem for n = k + 1. If a1 = b1, then according to induction
hypothesis, we have pn ≤ 2(k − 1). Otherwise, we have a1 = 0 and b1 = 1. If for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ k+1, ai = 0 and bi = 1, then the interval can be represented by prefix
∗, i.e., pn = 1. The interval [a1a2 · · · ak+1, b1b2 · · · bk+1] can be represented by
[0a2 · · · ak+1, 011 · · ·1] ∪ [100 · · ·0, 1b2 · · · bk+1]. According to Lemma 2, we need
at most k prefixes to represent interval [0a2 · · · ak+1, 011 · · ·1], and according to
Lemma 1, we need at most k prefixes to represent interval [100 · · ·0, 1b2 · · · bk+1].
Hence for n = k + 1, we have pn ≤ 2k. 2
B Known plaintext attack
In this appendix, we analyze the information an eavesdropper can obtain by
comparing the 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 pairs known by him/her to a ciphertext.
Hereafter we will assume the length of the binary representation of the data,
denoted by n, is very long, i.e., n → ∞. Suppose that an eavesdropper obtains
2k pairs of 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 randomly, and the average length of the prefix
he/she can obtain from a random ciphertext is Ak. Then Ak can be computed as
follows.
In the first step, the eavesdropper will compare the first bit of the cipher-
text with all the 2k pairs of 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉. If, among them, 2l pairs of
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k 1 2 4 8 16
Ak 2 2.666667 3.504762 4.421077 5.377378
k 32 64 128 256 512
Ak 6.355176 7.343990 8.338377 9.335558 10.334156
Table 1: Ak by varying k
〈plaintext, ciphertext〉 match the first bit of the ciphertext, then the other 2(k−l)
pairs are not useful for further deriving prefix information. Therefore, the total
prefix information the eavesdropper can obtain is the first bit plus the prefix in-
formation he/she may obtain with 2l pairs of 〈plaintext, ciphertext〉, which is
equal to 1 + Al. Since the possibility for 2l pairs out of 2k pairs of 〈plaintext,
ciphertext〉 to match the first bit of a ciphertext is (1/2)kClk, the average length




It is obvious that A0 is equal to 0. The remaining values of Ak can be computed
inductively. For example, A1 = 1 + 12A1, thus A1 = 2, which is consistent with
the result presented in Section 6. Table 1 shows Ak for several different values of
k. Figure 5 presents the curve of Ak by varying k, which is bounded by log2 k+2.





























average length of prefix revealed
log(k)/log(2)+2
Figure 5: Ak by varying k
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